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Early estimation of pandemic influenza Antiviral and Vaccine
Effectiveness (EAVE): use of a unique community and
laboratory national data-linked cohort study
Colin R Simpson,1* Nazir Lone,1 Jim McMenamin,2 Rory Gunson,3
Chris Robertson,4 Lewis D Ritchie5 and Aziz Sheikh1
1Centre for Medical Informatics, The Usher Institute of Population Health Sciences and
Informatics, The University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, UK
2Health Protection Scotland, Glasgow, UK
3West of Scotland Specialist Virology Centre, Glasgow, UK
4Department of Mathematics and Statistics, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow, UK
5Centre of Academic Primary Care, University of Aberdeen, Aberdeen, UK
*Corresponding author c.simpson@ed.ac.uk
Background: After the introduction of any new pandemic influenza, population-level surveillance and
rapid assessment of the effectiveness of a new vaccination will be required to ensure that it is targeted to
those at increased risk of serious illness or death from influenza.
Objective: We aimed to build a pandemic influenza reporting platform that will determine, once a new
pandemic is under way: the uptake and effectiveness of any new pandemic vaccine or any protective
effect conferred by antiviral drugs once available; the clinical attack rate of pandemic influenza; and the
existence of protection provided by previous exposure to, and vaccination from, A/H1N1 pandemic or
seasonal influenza/identification of susceptible groups.
Design: An observational cohort and test-negative study design will be used (post pandemic).
Setting: A national linkage of patient-level general practice data from 41 Practice Team Information
general practices, hospitalisation and death certification, virological swab and serology-linked data.
Participants: We will study a nationally representative sample of the Scottish population comprising
300,000 patients. Confirmation of influenza using reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction and,
in a subset of the population, serology.
Interventions: Future available pandemic influenza vaccination and antivirals will be evaluated.
Main outcome measures: To build a reporting platform tailored towards the evaluation of pandemic
influenza vaccination. This system will rapidly measure vaccine effectiveness (VE), adjusting for
confounders, estimated by determining laboratory-confirmed influenza; influenza-related morbidity
and mortality, including general practice influenza-like illnesses (ILIs); and hospitalisation and death from
influenza and pneumonia. Once a validated haemagglutination inhibition assay has been developed
(and prior to the introduction of any vaccination), cross-reactivity with previous exposure to A/H1N1 or
A/H1N1 vaccination, other pandemic influenza or other seasonal influenza vaccination or exposure
will be measured.
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Conclusions: A new sentinel system, capable of rapidly determining the estimated incidence of pandemic
influenza, and pandemic influenza vaccine and antiviral uptake and effectiveness in preventing influenza
and influenza-related clinical outcomes, has been created. We have all of the required regulatory approvals
to allow rapid activation of the sentinel systems in the event of a pandemic. Of the 41 practices expressing
an interest in participating, 40 have completed all of the necessary paperwork to take part in the reporting
platform. The data extraction tool has been installed in these practices. Data extraction and deterministic
linkage systems have been tested. Four biochemistry laboratories have been recruited, and systems for
serology collection and linkage of samples to general practice data have been put in place.
Future work: The reporting platform has been set up and is ready to be activated in the event of any
pandemic of influenza. Building on this infrastructure, there is now the opportunity to extend the network
of general practices to allow important subgroup analyses of VE (e.g. for patients with comorbidities,
at risk of serious ILI) and to link to other data sources, in particular to test for maternal outcomes in
pregnant patients.
Study registration: This study is registered as ISRCTN55398410.
Funding: The National Institute for Health Research Health Technology Assessment programme.
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Plain English summary
During the 20th and 21st centuries, there have been four pandemics of influenza (influenza that hasspread throughout populations across the world: 1918–19, 1957–8, 1968–9, 2009–10) producing very
large numbers of cases and a large numbers of deaths (with an estimated 20–40 million, 1 million,
1 million and 0.25 million deaths, respectively). This was owing to the population being especially affected
by the new influenza viruses involved. After the introduction of any new pandemic influenza, as well as
front-line health-care workers and carers, it is important that we target vaccination at those who are likely
to be at increased risk of serious illness or death, for example (1) those with any underlying medical
conditions (e.g. chronic heart or lung disease); (2) those who were not exposed to previous pandemic
influenza or vaccinations; and (3) those who might be in novel risk groups that may make them uniquely
at risk to a new pandemic of influenza. It is also important to know how pandemic influenza is spreading
through our population (so that we can target vaccines or medications at particular areas of the country).
We therefore set out to create a pandemic influenza reporting platform, which will use data linked from
electronic health records and also stored bodily fluid called ‘serum’. We have created this platform to
provide us with timely and important information on any groups of people who are particularly susceptible
to the new pandemic influenza, how the influenza is spreading in our population and whether or not any
available vaccine or medication is working.
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Scientific summary
Background
During the 20th and 21st centuries, there have been four pandemics (global epidemics) of influenza
(1918–19, 1957–8, 1968–9, 2009–10) producing very large numbers of clinical cases and a large numbers
of deaths (with an estimated 20–40 million, 1 million, 1 million and 0.25 million deaths, respectively).
This was owing to the population having little immunity to the novel influenza viruses involved (H1N1,
H2N2 and H3N2). Immunisation programmes delivered in primary health-care settings have been shown to
be acceptable (as evidenced by previous high uptake rates) and effective, and this will therefore be the
mainstay of disease prevention in any new influenza pandemic.
After the introduction of any new pandemic influenza, as well as front-line health-care workers, any
new vaccination will be targeted at those who are considered to be at increased risk of serious illness or
death from influenza infection, for example (1) those with any underlying medical conditions (e.g. chronic
renal disease, immunosuppression resulting from disease or treatment, chronic heart disease, chronic
respiratory disease); (2) those who may lack herd immunity (cross-reactivity) from exposure to previous
pandemics or vaccinations; and (3) novel risk groups that are uniquely at risk because of a tropism
exhibited by the virus. These national vaccination strategies have been shown to represent a potentially
important approach to reduce both influenza-related illness and death, hence the considerable investment in
this approach in many parts of the world.
Objectives
Building on prior work, we aimed to enhance a previously used data linkage approach, which allowed the
effectiveness of the 2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic vaccine to be determined. We wished to create a
pandemic influenza reporting platform. We anticipate that the platform will allow rapid extraction and
linkage of general practice clinical, prescribing and vaccination data from sentinel general practices to
virology laboratory information [serology and real-time polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) test results].
The objective of the platform is that, once a new pandemic is under way, the following should be
rapidly determined:
l the uptake and effectiveness of any new pandemic vaccine (if) available
l the analysis of any protective effect conferred by antiviral drugs
l the clinical attack rate of pandemic influenza in general practice,
and, with stored serological information, determine:
l the existence of any protective effect provided by previous exposure to, and vaccination from, A/H1N1
pandemic or seasonal influenza/identification of susceptible groups.
Methods
The setting for this project was 41 participating general practices based throughout Scotland. The
pre-pandemic phase of this project aimed to: complete all ethical, privacy and governance approvals; set
up and test the data extraction systems; and create a repository of serology samples from patients
registered with practices. Secure general practice data extraction systems supported by Trusted Third Party
Albasoft Ltd have been tested.
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Data on vaccination and other patient characteristics from general practice can be linked using the NHS
Scotland’s unique patient identifier – the Community Health Index number to the Scottish Morbidity
Record catalogue, which has information on all inpatient hospitalisations and mortality within Scotland,
virological RT-PCR data and serological information collected from patients with influenza-like illness (ILI) by
general practices. The West of Scotland Specialist Virology Centre (WoSSVC) will store 2000 biochemistry
samples from a subset of participating practices within NHS Lothian and Greater Glasgow and Clyde
Health Board areas.
In the event of any new pandemic influenza data, statistical scripts have been created that can calculate
odds and risk ratios (adjusted for age, sex and deprivation) for differences in proportions of vaccine
uptake between different groups of patients and for investigating trends in vaccine uptake. For vaccine
effectiveness using information from linked virological swab data, a logistic regression model will be
fitted, adjusting for the effects of sex, age, socioeconomic status and being in an at-risk morbidity group.
In addition, using the cohort method, the proportion of ILI, acute respiratory disease and other adverse
outcomes, such as hospitalisation or death from influenza, between vaccinated and unvaccinated cases will
be ascertained. These data will also be used to determine the clinical attack rate of pandemic influenza.
To determine the existence of any protective effect provided by previous exposure to, and vaccination
from, A/H1N1 pandemic or seasonal influenza/identification of susceptible groups, serology samples are
linked to general practice data (which provide patient information on patient vaccination status,
demographics and comorbidities/pregnancy). They will then be tested (once a validated haemagglutination
inhibition assay has been developed) prior to the introduction of any vaccination. A seropositive result
will be determined using the universally accepted cut-off point of a 1 : 40 dilution for a panel of influenza
strains. These tests will be undertaken by the WoSSVC in Glasgow. A binomial analysis and logistic
regression will be used to determine differences in seropositivity rates owing to age, sex, comorbidity and
vaccination status. Results will be expressed as the mean seropositivity rate with 95% confidence intervals.
Conclusions
A new sentinel system capable of rapidly determining the estimated incidence of pandemic influenza,
and pandemic influenza vaccine and antiviral uptake and effectiveness in preventing influenza and
influenza-related clinical outcomes, has been created. We have all of the required regulatory approvals to
allow rapid activation of the sentinel systems in the event of a pandemic. Of the 41 practices expressing
an interest in participating, 40 have completed all of the necessary paperwork to take part in the reporting
platform. The data extraction tool has been installed in these practices. Data extraction and deterministic
linkage systems have been tested. Four biochemistry laboratories have been recruited, and systems for
serology collection and linkage of samples to general practice data have been put in place.
Study registration
This study is registered as ISRCTN55398410.
Funding details
This project was funded by the NIHR Health Technology Assessment programme.
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Chapter 1 Background
Description of the health problem
During the 20th and 21st centuries, there have been four pandemics (global epidemics) of influenza
(1918–19, 1957–8, 1968–9, 2009–10) producing very large numbers of clinical cases and, in the case of
the first three, large numbers of deaths (with an estimated 20–40 million, 1 million, 1 million and
1.25 million deaths, respectively). This was owing to the population having little immunity to the novel
influenza viruses involved (H1N1, H2N2, H3N2 and H1N1, respectively). The lack of herd immunity to the
novel influenza viruses implicated (i.e. H1N1, H2N2 and H3N2) is believed to have been a key factor
contributing to these very high numbers of deaths.1 The influenza A subtype, H1N1 virus, which emerged
in Mexico in March 2009, also produced a very large number of clinical cases, with one-third of the
population being found to be infected by early 2010.2 Previous vaccination to seasonal influenza vaccine
conferred little or no cross-reactivity antibody responses.3 Furthermore, persons aged < 30 years were
found to have little evidence of cross-reactivity to the pandemic virus, with a proportion of older adults
having pre-existing antibodies.
After the introduction of any new pandemic influenza, as well as front-line health-care workers, any new
vaccination will be targeted at those who are considered to be at increased risk of serious illness or death
from influenza infection, for example (1) those with any underlying medical conditions (e.g. chronic
renal disease, immunosuppression resulting from disease or treatment, chronic heart disease, chronic
respiratory disease); (2) those who may lack herd immunity (cross-reactivity) from exposure to previous
pandemics or vaccinations; and (3) novel risk groups that are uniquely at risk because of a tropism
exhibited by the virus. These national vaccination strategies have been shown to represent a potentially
important approach to reduce both influenza-related illness and death, hence the considerable
investment in this approach in many parts of the world.
Existing evidence
In the 2009 H1N1 pandemic, the earliest estimate of vaccine effectiveness (VE) in the UK was published in
July 2010,4 4 months after the last case of influenza in that season (18 March 2010 in Scotland).5 Further
VE estimates were published in 2011.6–8 Serology and data gathered in Scotland during 2009–10 also
found that rates of immunisation for those most susceptible to serious influenza-like illness (ILI) were less
than optimal. For instance, just one in four patients aged 5–50 years with serious underlying illnesses
received monovalent A/H1N1 vaccine and an estimated 10,000 patients aged > 75 years with no
underlying disease were issued the A/H1N1 vaccine in Scotland. There are multiple factors that might
have led to poorer uptake among younger people in at-risk groups and these include having fewer
comorbidities and concerns over VE or safety,9 and poorly targeted patient reminder/recall systems.10
Furthermore, after the first round of vaccinations, the most socioeconomically deprived patients in Scotland
were also found to be more susceptible and were no more likely to receive the vaccine than the most
affluent people.2 This increased susceptibility, however, was not explained by differences in local
population density or between urban and rural areas or by differences in ethnicity.
DOI: 10.3310/hta19790 HEALTH TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT 2015 VOL. 19 NO. 79
© Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2015. This work was produced by Simpson et al. under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State for
Health. This issue may be freely reproduced for the purposes of private research and study and extracts (or indeed, the full report) may be included in professional journals
provided that suitable acknowledgement is made and the reproduction is not associated with any form of advertising. Applications for commercial reproduction should be
addressed to: NIHR Journals Library, National Institute for Health Research, Evaluation, Trials and Studies Coordinating Centre, Alpha House, University of Southampton Science
Park, Southampton SO16 7NS, UK.
1
Chapter 2 Research questions
Building on prior work,
4,6 we aimed to enhance a previously used data linkage approach, which allowed
the effectiveness of the 2009–10 H1N1 influenza pandemic vaccine to be determined. We wished to
create a pandemic influenza reporting platform (Figure 1). The platform will allow rapid extraction and
linkage of general practice, clinical, prescribing and vaccination data from sentinel general practices to
virology information [real-time polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) swab and serology] using NHS
Scotland’s Community Health Index (CHI) number, a unique patient identifier.
We anticipate that the platform will help to rapidly determine, once a new pandemic is under way, the:
l uptake and effectiveness of any new pandemic vaccine (if) available
l analysis of any protective effect conferred by antivirals
l clinical attack rate of pandemic influenza in general practice,
and, with stored serological information, determine:
l the existence of any protective effect provided by previous exposure to and vaccination from A/H1N1
pandemic or seasonal influenza/identification of susceptible groups.
Invitations and consent to 41 (Practice Team Information Sentinel) general
practices. Ethical, privacy and governance approvals
General practices
(Trusted Third Party Data extraction software installed)
Specified data
extract from general
practice
 (n ≈ 300,000)
Patient serology
from biochemistry frozen
samples to laboratory
 (n ≈ 2000)
Anonymised serology
stored + 10-year age
band, sex, vaccination,
comorbidity, 
socioeconomic status
Pandemic 
preparation
Data linkage
Data transfer
Post pandemic
Patient swabs 
for pandemic 
influenza status
(n ≈ 1500)
Scottish Morbidity Record 01 
and linked general practice
data (hospitalisation/death) 
from ISD
Processed database to HPS for statistical analysis
Virus attack rate
(cross-reaction)
Vaccine uptake VE
Antiviral effectiveness
FIGURE 1 Flow diagram for the Early estimation of pandemic influenza Antiviral and Vaccine Effectiveness project.
HPS, Health Protection Scotland; ISD, Information Services Division.
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Chapter 3 Methods
This study involves a quantitative evaluation of aspects of any future vaccination or antiviral programme(implemented through general practice) to prevent pandemic influenza. Data extraction and linkage
systems, and database analyses will help estimate VE and antiviral effectiveness. Data generated will also
allow for common reports to be developed for UK and European colleagues (e.g. similar to Royal College
of General Practitioners’ ‘flu spotter’ practices).11
Pre-pandemic preparedness phase
This pre-pandemic phase of this project aimed to set up and test the data extraction systems, and create a
repository of serology samples from patients registered with practices (see Figure 1).
Primary care data set
The Practice Team Information (PTI) network of general practices covers a 6% representative sample of
the Scottish population (n= 300,000).12 These general practices are given financial incentives by NHS
National Services Scotland to record and code additional data electronically, over and above that routinely
recorded for clinical care or as part of the PTI project (e.g. age, comorbidity, out-of-hours contacts and
socioeconomic status), including influenza vaccination status.13 Data from general practices within Scotland
are of high quality and useful for epidemiological research.14 The completeness of capture of contacts and
accuracy of clinical event coding in general practice (using Read codes) has been found to be > 91%.15
Furthermore, when influenza vaccination is provided as part of the general medical services contract, any
variation between expected and reported vaccination uptake by practices is likely to be assessed by Health
Board quality assurance and appraisal teams.16
At the time of this report, 41 of the PTI practices had expressed an interest in participating, and 40 had
completed all of the necessary University of Edinburgh contractual paperwork to participate in the study.
All 41 practices had installed the necessary software for secure extract and transfer of data (Figure 2). This
secure extraction system is supported by a Trusted Third Party, Albasoft Ltd, Inverness, UK. From these
general practice data a database of information is generated (Table 1). These data have been tested for
the presence of the necessary data fields for linkage and analysis.
The identifier CHI from general practice data was one-way encrypted (the encryption cannot be reversed)
using pseudonymisation software (OpenPseudonymiser, version 0.9.7, University of Nottingham, Nottingham,
UK). Once all practices have completed the necessary paperwork, the CHI will be used deterministically to
link general practice data to other data sources, which will also have used the pseudonymisation software
to encrypt CHI. The CHI data set lists everyone who is registered with a general practitioner or who is eligible
for NHS screening services, and forms a unique identifier for NHS use. Since 2006 it has been mandated for
use in all NHS Scotland communications and contacts, obviating the use of other personal identifiers, such
as names and addresses. CHI is available on almost all data fields used in this project (> 97%).17 Deterministic
linkage using CHI has been carried out previously on data from 2000 to 2008 (without any issues),18 and
is now routinely used by Health Protection Scotland (HPS) for data set linkages required for seasonal
influenza monitoring.
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Trusted Third Party
(quality check)
Encrypted CHI
 and selected data
NHS 
Mail/N3
NHSNHS – N3
Trusted Third Party
automated data
extraction/encryptionGeneral practice
 database
Encrypt CHI
 and selected data
ISD and HPS
Encrypted CHI
 and selected data
ISD and HPS
Analysis data set
CHI deleted 
Assigned ID 
SMR01/RT-PCR
linked
FIGURE 2 Secure data transfer from general practice. HPS, Health Protection Scotland; ID, identifier;
ISD, Information Services Division; N3, the NHS national broadband network linking hospitals, medical centres and
GPs; SMR01, Scottish Morbidity Record (hospital/mortality).
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TABLE 1 Early estimation of pandemic influenza Antiviral and Vaccine Effectiveness specification and codes
Variable Data items Data source
Age, sex SMR01, general practice
Scottish Index of Multiple
Deprivation/rural urbana
General practice
Hospital admission type
Emergency/routine admission
Date of first admission
Length of stay
SMR01
Clinical condition codingb Influenza vaccination General practice
Clinical condition codingb Pneumococcal vaccination General practice
Prescription Antiviral prescriptions General practice
Prescription Asthma and COPD-related prescriptions General practice
Clinical condition codingb Clinical at-risk groups (chronic respiratory disease, chronic
heart disease, chronic kidney disease, chronic liver disease,
chronic neurological disease, immunosuppression,
diabetes, pregnancy)
General practice
Diagnosis fields Charlson comorbidities SMR01
Palliative care field General practice
Prescription, clinical attendance Number of previous general practice consultations,
prescribed drugs
General practice
Clinical condition codingb Smoking,a exercise statusa General practice
Number of previous hospital
admissions
SMR01
Clinical condition codingb Pregnancy General practice
QOF exception reported
(patient unsuitable, etc.)
General practice
Clinical condition codingb Home oxygen General practice
Clinical condition coding,b
diagnosis
Trauma General practice, SMR01
Clinical condition coding,b
diagnosis
ILI General practice, SMR01,
death records
Clinical condition coding,b
diagnosis
Asthma, and COPD symptoms and exacerbations General practice, SMR01
Clinical condition coding,b
diagnosis
Appendicitis General practice, SMR01
Clinical condition coding,b
diagnosis
Hernia General practice, SMR01
RT-PCR swab results ECOSS virology database
COPD, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease; ECOSS, Electronic Communication of Surveillance in Scotland; QOF, Quality
Outcomes Framework; SMR01, Scottish Morbidity Record (hospital/mortality).
a Variable with possible missing data.
b Clinician condition coding – Read code [World Health Organization. International Classification of Diseases.
URL: www.who.int/classifications/icd/en/ (accessed 1 October 2015)].
DOI: 10.3310/hta19790 HEALTH TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT 2015 VOL. 19 NO. 79
© Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2015. This work was produced by Simpson et al. under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State for
Health. This issue may be freely reproduced for the purposes of private research and study and extracts (or indeed, the full report) may be included in professional journals
provided that suitable acknowledgement is made and the reproduction is not associated with any form of advertising. Applications for commercial reproduction should be
addressed to: NIHR Journals Library, National Institute for Health Research, Evaluation, Trials and Studies Coordinating Centre, Alpha House, University of Southampton Science
Park, Southampton SO16 7NS, UK.
7
Real-time polymerase chain reaction test and serology data set
General practitioners participating in this study are also involved in the Scottish Immunisation Programme
Pandemic Influenza Primary care Reporting scheme.19 Practices are encouraged to obtain nasal/throat
swabs from patients of all ages who have symptoms that are suggestive of influenza. Each general practice
is requested to submit five swab samples per week to the West of Scotland Specialist Virology Centre
(WoSSVC), Glasgow, UK, for RT-PCR testing for a range of respiratory pathogens on any patient
presenting for consultation in the practice with influenza-like symptoms. Sampling is carried out on all age
groups independent of whether the patient has or has not been vaccinated. These data, along with results
from swabbing carried out in primary and secondary care for routine diagnostic purposes in symptomatic
patients outside the sentinel scheme, are entered into the Electronic Communication of Surveillance in
Scotland database held by HPS.20 These data are linked to general practice data to determine vaccination
status, patient characteristics and ILIs that present to general practice (see Figure 2).
Secondary care and mortality data set
The Scottish Morbidity Record (SMR) database has information on all inpatient hospitalisations within
Scotland (as well as information on death certification linked from National Records Scotland21) from 1981.
Hospital data are reliable, with completeness and accuracy rates exceeding 90%.22 Using the data
extracted from participating general practices, a deterministic linkage can carried out using the CHI
number (see Figure 2).
Serology data set
As part of the Early estimation of pandemic influenza Antiviral and Vaccine Effectiveness (EAVE) project,
2000 biochemistry samples are to be collected and stored in readiness for a future pandemic. Biochemistry
laboratories serving participating general practices will set-aside serology samples for transfer to the WoSSVC
laboratory for storage. Four biochemistry laboratories serving NHS Lothian, and NHS Greater Glasgow and
Clyde Health Board areas [i.e. Glasgow Royal Infirmary, Western Infirmary, Southern General Hospital and the
Regional Virus Laboratory Specialist Virology Centre (Edinburgh)] have been recruited by the University of
Edinburgh, HPS and the WoSSVC laboratory. Serology samples from participating general practices were to
be set-aside manually by laboratory staff and sent to the WoSSVC laboratory. During this project, however,
new automated systems for sample handling were introduced at biochemistry laboratories, meaning
straightforward manual set-aside by the laboratory staff was no longer feasible. We therefore allocated
resource to create a Medical Laboratory Assistant (MLA) post within the WoSSVC laboratory, devoted to the
manual collection and cataloguing of serology samples by visiting the four biochemistry laboratories and
seeking out samples from EAVE practices. To ensure delivery of the EAVE project objectives, a special
provision was entered into a service-level agreement between HPS (NHS National Services Scotland) and the
WoSSVC (NHS Greater Glasgow and Clyde).
Secure data transfer systems have been implemented to allow linkage of patient vaccination status and
other characteristics (e.g. age band, sex, comorbidity, socioeconomic status) to serology samples using
deterministic data linkage (Figure 3). This is necessary to ensure that samples collected have representation
across age, sex and comorbidity groups. Once the serology samples have been collated, patient vaccination
status and other characteristic data will be transferred to, and securely held by, HPS. These data will
represent the vaccination history and patient characteristics at, or near the time of, serology sample storage.
Once sampling has reached the total required, replacement of patients’ samples who have died or
deregistered from participating practices will be carried out. The secure data transfer system for the
general practice data required for linkage to serology has been successful tested, that is data from
primary care practices have been transferred to HPS using NHS secure file transfer protocols.
METHODS
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Power calculations
A power calculation was carried out to determine the numbers needed to detect a difference in the
relative risk of death between the vaccinated and unvaccinated groups. The power calculations are based
on (unpublished) data available at HPS from a subset of the practices recruited. With 41 practices, a
combined list size of approximately 300,000 patients is anticipated: 6% (n= 18,000) of patients will be
aged 0–4 years, 18% (n= 54,000) aged > 65 years, and 17% of those aged < 65 years in an at-risk
category on the basis of existing illnesses (n= 43,000). During the 2009–10 influenza pandemic, 15% of
the population were vaccinated against A/H1N1 influenza and this figure is used throughout the proposed
study; larger values to 20–25% will be associated with an increased power or smaller VEs detectable, and
smaller values with a reduced power or the ability to detect only large VEs.
Trusted Third Party
Encrypted CHI
 and selected risk 
factor data
(3) Patient
characteristics to HPS
(4) Encrypted CHI and 
assigned ID sent to HPS
(1) Biochemistry 
laboratories/MLA select 
appropriate sample
residual and send to WoSSVC
General practice
database
Biochemistry
departments
Encrypted CHI
 and selected data
Serology 
off-samples 
(weekly) and CHI
(2) Trusted Third Party
automated data
extraction/encryption
WoSSVC laboratory
CHI deleted – WoSSVC
assigned ID
Samples frozen
(5) WoSSVC monitors
representativeness of
samples and feeds back
to biochemistry laboratories 
to select under-represented
groups
FIGURE 3 Secure data/serology transfer from general practices and biochemistry units to WoSSVC for storage.
ID, identifier.
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In a normal influenza season of 4 months, we report about 0.4–0.6% of the HPS surveillance cohort with
a virological swab during the influenza season. This would translate to around 1300–1900 swabs in the
EAVE cohort. During a pandemic we anticipate a greater frequency of swabbing, possibly double, and
so base our calculations on a conservative availability of 1500 swabs. Assuming that 20% of those
unvaccinated test positive for influenza (based on seasonal influenza figures from HPS) then we anticipate
a 90% power to detect a VE of at least 43% (see Table 2). In a pandemic we anticipate a higher
percentage positivity among the unvaccinated, and if this was 40% then VEs in excess of 28% would be
detected. With increased swabbing in a pandemic, say at 3000 swabs, then VEs in excess of 20% would
be detected with a 90% power.
Consultation rates for ILIs were around 30–50 per 100,000 per day during the peak of the pandemic. In
the best-case scenario, the vaccine is available before the peak of the pandemic, and, in this case, over a
90-day observation period there is at least a 90% power to detect a 10% vaccine effect in the time to the
first ILIs consultation from the beginning of the pandemic period (Table 2). If vaccination is available only
during the pandemic period then the power will be lower. Assuming a 40% attack rate in the pandemic
period then consultation rates will be lower (as some patients have already been exposed) and the average
follow-up period lower. There will be at least an 80% power to detect vaccine effects of ≥ 20%.
TABLE 2 Early estimation of pandemic influenza Antiviral and Vaccine Effectiveness outcomes and detectable
effect size in the best-case scenario when the vaccine is available before the peak of the pandemic
Outcome
Exposure
of interest
Statistical
method useda
Effect size for influenza
vaccine detectable at
90% power
Effect size for antiviral
detectable at
90% power
RT-PCR Influenza
vaccination
Logistic regression 20–43% 25–39%
Primary care, ILI Influenza
vaccination,
antivirals
Cox proportional
hazards
10% 9%
Hospitalisation, IP 55% 48%
Hospitalisation, IPC 33% 29%
Hospitalisation, CVD 36% 32%
Hospitalisation, all 11% 10%
Deaths, IPb – –
Deaths, IPCb – –
Deaths, IPC
plus CVD
51% 45%
Deaths, all 33% 29%
Hospitalisation,
trauma
26% 23%
Hospitalisation,
appendicitis
and herniab
– –
CVD, cerebrovascular and cardiovascular disease; IP, influenza, pneumonia; IPC, influenza, pneumonia, chronic obstructive
pulmonary disease.
a Adjusted for age, sex, Scottish Index of Multiple Deprivation urban/rural status, smoking status, Charlson and at-risk
comorbidities, pregnancy, prior influenza and pneumococcal vaccination, and prior number of general practice
encounters and prescriptions.
b No detectable differences for 90% power.
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The rate of hospitalisations for influenza or pneumonia was 1 per 100,000 per day6 and there will be a
90% power to detect a vaccine effect of 55% in the time to first admission under the best-case scenario.
For the combined influenza, pneumonia or chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD) the rate was
2.8 per 100,000 per day;6 under the best-case scenario there is 90% power to detect a VE of 33%, and
66% if the vaccine is available during the pandemic. With an emergency hospitalisation rate of 2.3 per
100,000 per day for cerebrovascular and cardiovascular disease (CVD),6 VEs in excess of 36% can be detected
with 90% power under the best-case scenario, whereas only those in excess of 75% can be detected if the
vaccine becomes available during the pandemic. The rate for any emergency hospitalisations are much
greater at 27.8 per 100,000 per day and the detectable VEs much lower. Under the best-case scenario we
calculate a power of 90% to detect a VE in excess of 11%, and this rises to 21% if the vaccine becomes
available only during the pandemic. Trauma admissions are used as negative controls and, with a rate of 4.5
per 100,000 per day, there is a power of 90% to detect VEs in excess of 26% under the best-case scenario,
and 52% if the vaccine becomes available only during the pandemic.
For investigation of mortality, the rates of most of the end points are too low to be able to detect VEs
of any reasonable magnitude. Based on data in the previous pandemic, the mortality rates of death from
pneumonia are 0.11, COPD 0.24, CVD 0.78 and all cause 2.72 – all per 100,000 per day.6 The principal
analysis will be based on the combined end point of influenza, pneumonia, COPD or CVD, which
has a rate of 1.14 per 100,000 per day; there is 90% power to detect a VE of 51% under the
best-case scenario. For all-cause mortality the detectable VE is 33% at 90% power.
For the virological outcome of confirmed influenza, vaccine effects in excess of 50% would be anticipated
for a well-matched vaccine and so this cohort should have sufficient power. For the less-specific outcomes of
ILI consultations, vaccine effects around 20% are anticipated and, again, the study is adequately powered,
even under the second scenario of the vaccine not being available until midway through the pandemic. For
the hospitalisation outcomes, a VE of 32% was reported for the 2009 pandemic for hospitalisations for CVD5
and the current study has power to detect this and, also at the same level, for the combined influenza,
pneumonia or COPD emergency hospitalisations. There is limited power to detect a reasonable vaccine effect
on influenza or pneumonia hospitalisations or death. Detectable VEs are of the order of 33–50% and these
are too high for such non-specific outcomes.
The power analysis for antiviral effectiveness is similar to that for vaccine exposure, although is much
more speculative in view of the potential uncertainties surrounding the use of antivirals: some will receive
antivirals for treatment of symptoms, and others will receive them for prophylactic treatment to prevent
symptoms or reduce the symptoms. This should mean that individuals who receive antivirals prior to the
event are expected to have fewer adverse outcomes of ILI consultations, hospitalisation and death than
those who did not. For the same level of population exposure for the antivirals as vaccine (15%) then the
detectable differences will be the same. During the 2009 pandemic the stockpile of antivirals was sufficient
for 50% of the population, so we calculate powers assuming that 20% of the population are exposed.
The detectable VEs assuming a best-case scenario are presented in Table 2. The detectable VEs will be
lower if the use of antivirals is > 20%.
Statistical analysis plan
Vaccine uptake will be modelled through a logistic regression. For the virological test outcome of influenza
positivity compared with no influenza among patients who have ILI symptoms, the primary analysis will be
through a logistic regression generalised additive model, in which the time during the season is modelled
as a spline function. For the consultation, hospitalisation and death outcomes the analysis will be based on
a Poisson regression model or equivalent time-dependent Cox model.
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Statistical scripts have been created, in R version 2.14.1 (The R Foundation for Statistical Computing,
Vienna, Austria), which can calculate odds ratios (ORs: adjusted for age, sex, clinical risk group and
deprivation) for differences in proportion of vaccine uptake between different groups of patients (sex, age,
Scottish Index of Multiple Deprivation categories and at-risk groups) and for investigating trends in vaccine
uptake. Vaccine uptake, and 95% confidence intervals (CIs) based on the Wilson method, will be reported
for these broad categories at specific times during the pandemic.
For VE using information from linked virological swab data (a binary event), the logistic regression model
will adjust for the effects of sex, age, socioeconomic status (Scottish Index of Multiple Deprivation23) and
being in an at-risk morbidity group (the test-negative study design). A spline function for time during the
pandemic season will be used to model the background rate of influenza and correct for any potential bias
associated with the proportions of test-negative and test-positive patients at different periods during the
pandemic. VE will be measured by comparing the results from swabs taken after vaccination among
those vaccinated to swabs taken among those unvaccinated at the time the swab is collected. A delay
of 14 days after vaccination will be used to establish the protective effect of the influenza vaccine. The
adjusted estimate of VE= (1 –OR) × 100, where the OR is derived from the coefficient of vaccine status in
the logistic model.
The rate of ILI, acute respiratory disease and other adverse outcomes – including hospitalisations and
death – between vaccinated and unvaccinated cases will be ascertained. CIs for the rate ratio (RR) and
tests of the differences between two rates will be carried out using the ‘midp method’ in the ‘rateratio’
function and ‘rate2by2.test’ function, respectively, using the ‘epitools’ package in R.24 For small samples,
CIs for the RR will be estimated using the Microsoft Excel® (version 14.5.1) workbook (Microsoft
Corporation, Redmond, WA, USA).25 Illness RRs, that is the ratio of the rate of admission to hospital or
general practice consultation in the vaccinated compared with the rate of first admission to hospital
or general practice consultation among those who did not receive the vaccine, will be calculated in both
the ‘at-risk’ populations, age groups and the general population. This is a direct measure of VE. The
unadjusted estimate of VE= (1 – RR) × 100.
Adjusted RRs of VE for prevention of hospitalisation/death/general practice consultation will be derived
from time-dependent Cox models or the equivalent Poisson regression models, taking into account the
time at risk and the possibility of multiple events (not for death). These models will adjust for sex, age,
deprivation and clinical risk group, with vaccination group representing a time-dependent covariate.
Individuals will be in the unvaccinated group (and will accumulate time at risk) until 14 days after the
receipt of the vaccine and then they will switch to the vaccinated group. Within the Poisson regression
models, the calendar time through the season will be modelled using spline functions.
In all models used to estimate the VE, propensity variables associated with the receipt of a vaccination and
effect modifiers – such as vaccinations, consultations and hospitalisation in the previous influenza season,
urban/rural status, smoking status, Charlson Score and pregnancy – will be used to control for the healthy
vaccine effect.26 This is in addition to the demographic variables, which will always be used.
Binomial analysis and logistic regression will be used to determine differences in seropositivity proportions
owing to age, sex, comorbidity and vaccination status. Results will be expressed as the proportion
seropositive rate with 95% CIs.
The analysis of antiviral use and the protective effect of antivirals will be analysed using similar approaches. The
study cohort will provide information on the prescription of antivirals by general practice, although if there
are other major routes of administration of antivirals then this information will not be captured, limiting the
analyses that can be carried out here. Our initial plan is to include a binary variable of ever/never exposure to
antivirals as an explanatory variable in the VE analyses. For the consultation, hospitalisation and death rates
analysis, this antiviral exposure will be a second time-dependent exposure. If the data permit, we will consider
using a measure of the volume of exposure, such as the length of the prescription. In models in which the
METHODS
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primary aim is to estimate the effectiveness of vaccine, antiviral use will be included as a covariate. In models in
which the principal aim is to investigate the effect of antivirals, exposure to the vaccine will be included, if
appropriate. For example, antiviral effect may be estimated from a period before the vaccine becomes available
and, in such instances, no adjustment needs to be made.
Post pandemic
With the emergence of any new pandemic influenza, the following will be calculated to evaluate any
pandemic influenza vaccination programme:
1. From general practice data The vaccination uptake in the relevant ‘at-risk’ populations (patients aged
< 65 years with ‘at-risk’ comorbidities and those aged > 65 years) and the general population recorded
by general practices.
2. From linkage of general practice and Electronic Communication of Surveillance in Scotland data
Influenza positivity from virological swab data in vaccinated and unvaccinated patients stratified by
‘at-risk’ populations, age, sex and socioeconomic status.
3. By combining general practice and SMR01 data Consultation for influenza-related morbidity
(e.g. influenza, pneumonia, COPD and cardiac-related consultations) and issue of antiviral therapy
from general practice data in vaccinated and unvaccinated patients stratified by ‘at-risk’ populations,
age, sex and socioeconomic status. Mortality and influenza-related serious morbidity (e.g. influenza,
pneumonia, COPD, and cardiac-related death and hospitalisation) in vaccinated and unvaccinated
patients stratified by ‘at-risk’ populations, age, sex and socioeconomic status.
4. Data from general practice and virology data will permit the estimation of the clinical attack rate of
pandemic influenza.
5. For patients with stored serology [linked to general practice data held by HPS (see Figure 3) and once
a validated haemagglutination inhibition assay has been developed and prior to the introduction of any
vaccination], cross-reactivity with previous exposure to A/H1N1 or A/H1N1 vaccination, other pandemic
influenza or other seasonal influenza vaccination or exposure will be measured. A seropositive result
will be determined using the universally accepted cut-off point of a 1 : 40 dilution for a panel of
influenza strains. This will be undertaken by the WoSSVC in Glasgow.
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Chapter 4 Ethical and governance processes, and
pandemic study site set-up
A ll necessary approvals have been established in advance of any influenza pandemic. Permissionswere obtained from the Privacy Advisory Committee (National Services NHS Scotland) (reference
number 25/13), the Multicentre Research Ethics Committee (reference number 12/SS/0201), the National
Caldicott Guardian (reference number 25/11/2013), 12 NHS Health Boards and the participating general
practices. A poster to be displayed at the participating general practices regarding the collection of
serology samples can be found in Appendix 1. Ethics and governance processes took 1 year. On the
request of the National Caldicott Guardian, we sought accreditation by Health Improvement Scotland of
the EAVE serology collection for storage as a human tissue bank. The necessary approvals were granted
(GN13ID441), but this delayed serology collection by 12 months.
An Independent Steering Group was convened to oversee this work and comprised Neil Kelly (Chairperson,
General Practitioner), Jonathan Van Tam (Professor of Health Protection), Punam Mangtani (Senior Lecturer
in Epidemiology) and Elisabeth Ehrlich (Public and Patient Involvement representative). The Independent
Steering Group met once during the study.
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Chapter 5 Discussion
We have developed a new sentinel system that is capable of rapidly determining the estimatedincidence of pandemic influenza and pandemic influenza vaccine and antiviral uptake and
effectiveness in preventing influenza and influenza-related clinical outcomes.
We have all of the required regulatory approvals to allow rapid activation of the sentinel systems in the
event of a pandemic. Of the 41 practices expressing an interest in participating, 40 have completed all
the necessary paperwork to take part in the reporting platform. The data extraction tool has been installed
in these practices. Data extraction and deterministic linkage systems have been tested. Four biochemistry
laboratories have been recruited, and systems for serology collection and linkage of samples to general
practice data have been put in place.
The process of obtaining research governance, and privacy approvals and other project-related paperwork
required substantial project resource and time, and led to significant project delays. At the time of writing
this report, serology collection had not begun and six practices had still to complete final paperwork.
Serology delays were because of unanticipated regulatory approvals, usually applied for storage of human
tissue being requested for our serology samples (serology being considered as not relevant material
under the Human Tissue Act).27 We have also had significant delays caused by biochemistry laboratory
automation of serology handling. This required the creation of a new MLA post to help manually collect
and catalogue the serology samples. It is anticipated that although these significant delays have ensued, all
samples will be collected and linked to general practice data by the end of 2015. Practice recruitment was
resource intensive. In particular, regular communication with the practices to ensure completion of the
required paperwork (contract with the University of Edinburgh and invoicing) was required.
Similar to other sentinel systems,28 the sentinel system in use in Scotland uses clinician discretion based on
specified criteria (and patient permission) in the decision to swab and test for influenza, rather than have a
centrally managed process to ensure random sampling of patients for swabbing. This ensures that all
available resources are used to maximise the number of eligible patients swabbed by clinicians at sentinel
practices. In Scotland, reimbursement is available to practices for five swabs per day, and we therefore
acknowledge that some eligible patients may not be swabbed. Any bias from eligible patient not being
swabbed is limited by:
i. practices being required to swab the first two symptomatic patients per day, and at least the first two
vaccinated patients (to receive reimbursement from HPS) so that not only vaccinated patients with
ILI are swabbed
ii. the case–control status of the patient not being known to the clinician, and therefore the clinician not
being able to systematically swab vaccinated influenza-negative patients (as confirmation of influenza
diagnosis can be determined only from the swab submitted for RT-PCR testing)
iii. the measurement of incidence of non-influenza acute respiratory infection in vaccinated and
unvaccinated groups (to ensure that they are similar in vaccinated and unvaccinated groups)
iv. swabbing patterns being analysed to ascertain if systematic swabbing of only certain groups of patients
has taken place (e.g. only particular age groups, the vaccinated or influenza-positive patients).
For swabs from symptomatic patients that take place outside the systematically collected sentinel subset
(in primary and secondary care settings), we can identify these swabs and carry out subset analyses.
In previous seasonal influenza VE analyses, no major bias has been introduced by including these
non-sentinel swabs.18
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Maintenance of the project and activation in the event of
a pandemic
Once the preparation phase of this project is completed, the project will be put into hibernation until a
pandemic occurs. Overall responsibility for the EAVE project will remain with the principal investigator and
co-investigators (as long as they remain in post).
Routine maintenance of the pandemic reporting platform will be carried out with the following elements:
under a Trusted Third Party Agreement with the University of Edinburgh, Albasoft Ltd will carry out the
requisite practice data extractions that are necessary in the event of a pandemic. This will require that
the general practice data extraction and transfer (see Figures 2 and 3) will be routinely checked by the
Trusted Third Party administering these systems, Albasoft Ltd and HPS. Iterations of data extractions may
be required in the case of changes in coding or unforeseen developments in analysis methods.
Serology will be kept in storage until 2017, with a small turnover of samples (n= 200) in seasons 2015–16
and 2016–17. Beyond 2017, the serology storage will require further resources to maintain the freezing
of the serology store and a regular refresh to ensure inclusion of serology samples containing antigenically
drifted seasonal influenza and corresponding vaccine antibodies. However, under a service-level
agreement, HPS and the WoSSVC have responsibility for maintaining the serology store.
The governance and privacy framework for undertaking this research, particularly in relation to secondary
uses of data will require triennial review.
Recommendations for further research
The non-randomised nature of observational studies such as this are limited by the extent to which there
may be dissimilarities between vaccinated and non-vaccinated persons, in both their likelihood of receiving
vaccination, and in their subsequent care and follow-up, leading to overestimated benefits.26 A suitable
instrumental variable for these data should be constructed, validated and then included in the model to
remove any effects of hidden bias. Further research should be focused on the development of a valid
instrumental variable, for example census location data on influenza vaccine coverage similar to that used
by Wong et al.29
A National Pandemic Flu Service was not used in Scotland for the provision of antivirals (i.e. patients were
assessed in primary care, identified as requiring an antiviral and used the normal process of receiving
a prescription). Therefore, in the event of a more severe pandemic there may be a need to invoke
randomisation as the fairest means to allocate a scare treatment resource, or to spread the risks associated
with receiving an intervention that has not been as fully tested as would be the case outwith a pandemic.
A coding option to differentiate and account (methodologically) patients who were randomised to
intervention or control could be added to the statistical syntax in preparation for this.
Although the relatively modest size of our cohort makes it feasible to evaluate the pandemic influenza
vaccine or antiviral in a whole population, analysis of subgroups (in particular older age groups or people
with specific comorbidities, e.g. asthma) is likely to result in poorer precision and wide CIs. Work should
therefore aim to address this by ensuring increased power to test VE in these subgroups of patients while
minimising the effect of bias, such as health-seeking behaviour. This will require an increase in the number
of practices participating in the EAVE reporting system. Consideration should also be given to link to
other data sources, in particular to test for maternal outcomes in pregnant patients.
DISCUSSION
NIHR Journals Library www.journalslibrary.nihr.ac.uk
18
Conclusions
The EAVE sentinel surveillance system, which will provide a rapid evaluation of any available influenza
vaccination or antiviral and the clinical attack rate, has been set up and is ready to be activated in the event
of pandemic. The EAVE serology sample storage linked to general practice data, which aims to predict the
attack rate of any new pandemic of influenza, will be completed by the end of 2015.
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Appendix 1 General practice poster for
serology use
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Appendix 2 Project protocol
Project title
Early estimation of pandemic influenza Antiviral and Vaccine Effectiveness (EAVE) – use of a unique
community and laboratory national linked dataset (11\46\23).
Planned investigation
Research objectives
Building on prior work,1–3 we aim to enhance an approach used to determine effectiveness of the 2009
H1N1 influenza pandemic vaccine.2 By linking primary care clinical, prescribing and vaccination data from
40 sentinel general practices to laboratory serology and swab information using a unique patient identifier
the Community Health Index (CHI) number [HTA refs: 09/84/90] we will be able to determine once a new
pandemic is underway:
l the uptake and effectiveness of any new pandemic vaccine once available;
and using already collected serological information and swab data:
l the existence of any protective effect provided by previous exposure to and vaccination from A/H1N1
pandemic or seasonal influenza/identification of susceptible groups
l the attack rate of pandemic influenza
l the analysis of any protective effect conferred by antivirals.
Existing research
During the 20th and 21st centuries, there have been four pandemics (global epidemics) of influenza
(1918–1919, 1957–58, 1968–1969, 2009) producing very large numbers of clinical cases and in the case
of the first three, large numbers of deaths (with an estimated 20–40 million, 1 million and 1 million deaths
respectively). This was due to the population having little immunity to the novel influenza viruses involved
(H1N1, H2N2, H3N2 respectively).2 The lack of herd immunity to the novel influenza viruses implicated
(i.e. H1N1, H2N2 and H3N2) is believed to have been a key factor contributing to these very high numbers
of deaths in the 20th century.1 The influenza A subtype H1N1 virus, which emerged in Mexico in March
2009,2 also produced a very large number of clinical cases with a third of the population being found to
be infected by early 2010.4 Previous vaccination to seasonal influenza vaccine conferred little or no
cross-reactivity antibody responses.5 Furthermore, persons under the age of 30 years were found to
have little evidence of cross-reactivity to the pandemic virus, with a proportion of older adults having
pre-existing antibodies.
After the introduction of any new pandemic influenza, as well as frontline healthcare workers, any new
vaccination will be targeted at those who are considered to be at increased risk of serious illness or death
from influenza-like illness, i.e. those with any underlying medical conditions: e.g. chronic renal disease;
immunosuppression resulting from disease or treatment; chronic heart disease, etc. and also those that
may lack herd immunity (cross-reactivity) from exposure to previous pandemics or vaccinations. These
national vaccination strategies have been shown to represent a potentially important approach to reduce
both influenza-related illness and death, hence the considerable investment in this approach in many parts
of the world. However, in the 2009 H1N1 pandemic the earliest estimate of Vaccine Effectiveness (VE) in
the UK was published in July 20102 four months after the last case of influenza in that season (18 March
2010 in Scotland).6 Further VE estimates were published in 2011.7–8 Serology and data gathered in
Scotland during 2009/10 also found that rates of immunisation for those most susceptible to serious
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influenza-like illness were less than optimal. For instance, just one in four patients aged five to 50 years
with serious underlying illnesses received monovalent H1N1/A vaccine and an estimated 10,000 patients
aged > 75 years with no underlying disease were issued the H1N1/A vaccine in Scotland. Furthermore,
the most socio-economically deprived patients in Scotland were also found, after the first round of
vaccinations, to be more susceptible and were no more likely to receive the vaccine than the most
affluent people.4
Research methods
Design
Once the study commences, during a twenty-three month preparatory period, we will instigate a data and
serology collection linkage system whereby, once a new pandemic occurs, we will be able to undertake a
timely analysis of a large national retrospective observational cohort of patients using a unique community,
hospital and laboratory linked dataset.
Setting
The Practice Team Information (PTI) network of 40 general practices currently covers a six per cent
representative sample of the Scottish population (n= 300,000). These primary care practices are given
financial incentives by NHS National Services Scotland to record and code additional data electronically,
over and above that routinely recorded for clinical care or as part of the PTI project (e.g. age, co-morbidity,
out of hours contacts and socio-economic status), including influenza vaccination status.9 Data from general
practices within Scotland have shown to be of high quality and useful for epidemiological research.10
The completeness of capture of contacts and accuracy of clinical event coding in primary care (using Read
codes) has been found to be above 91%.11 The NHS in Scotland is free at the point of care. Access to
secondary and tertiary care is usually provided through primary care with almost all of the population being
registered with a general practitioner.
Once the pandemic is underway and using the unique Community Health Index (CHI) number, general
practice patient level data will be extracted and linked to the Scottish Morbidity Record (SMR) catalogue
which has information on all in-patient hospitalisations within Scotland (as well as information on death
certification linked from the General Register Office for Scotland [GROS] now known as NRS12) from 1981.
Hospital data are reliable, with completeness and accuracy rates exceeding 90%.11
In a sub-study, data on vaccination and other patient characteristics will be linked to serological
information collected from patients with influenza-like illness by practices. Scottish laboratories (West of
Scotland Specialist Virology Laboratory & Regional Virus Laboratory Specialist Virology Centre [Edinburgh])
will store 2,000 biochemistry samples from a subset of participating practices. Once 2,000 specimens have
been collected we will explore the replacement of patients’ samples who have died or deregistered from
participating practices using deterministic data linkage between the laboratory and primary care. Using
this technique we will also explore whether patient descriptions can be elucidated (e.g. age band, sex,
comorbidity, socio-economic status) and stored in readiness for a pandemic. Once the pandemic begins,
we will undertake a data linkage to determine other fields such as vaccination status (and other data
including antiviral prescribing and influenza/influenza-like illness) of these patients. Their serum will then be
tested to determine exposure to previous influenza viruses/vaccine (by the presence of antibodies) once a
suitable validated test has been developed. Swabs submitted to test for new pandemic influenza will be
compared to determine if previous vaccine or exposure confers protection.
Target population
300,000 people of all ages registered with participating practices throughout Scotland.
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Recruitment
The forty general practices and two laboratories will be recruited by the University of Edinburgh and Health
Protection Scotland (HPS).
Planned inclusion/exclusion criteria
All registered patients will be studied so there are no exclusion criteria.
Planned interventions
This study will involve a quantitative evaluation of aspects of any future vaccination programme
(implemented through general practice) to prevent pandemic influenza. Vaccine effectiveness will be
estimated by linking serology information generated from patients presenting with influenza-like illness
(via swabs on a convenience sampling basis 10 per week per practice) to clinical information generated
from primary care and hospitalisation and mortality data. Similar information on antivirals (if a well-matched
antiviral is available) will also be extracted.
In a sub-study, stored residual biochemistry samples from practices will be used to elucidate important
serological information on antibody cross-reactivity. This information will be used to inform policy-makers,
clinicians and the public of the relative benefits of the vaccination programme and help target any vaccine
at groups susceptible to infection.
Ethical and privacy arrangements
Permission to link the primary care, SMR, and laboratory databases for research purposes will be obtained
from the Privacy Advisory Group. Further permissions will be sought from the appropriate Research Ethics
Committee. Permissions from the general practices that contribute data to this project will be required.
Risks and anticipated benefits for trial participants and society, including
how benefits justify risks
As this study will assess VE using routinely collected and de-identified data, this work will not add any
known additional risks or benefits for the individual patients present in the databases. Informing patients
as to the potential risks and benefits of vaccination will remain at the discretion of the appropriate primary
care clinician. There are however potentially large societal benefits from targeting vaccination programmes
to groups vulnerable to infection and assessing the effectiveness and impact of any vaccine for Scotland
and the UK as a whole, but also for the international scientific community.
Statistical analysis
Odds and risk ratios (adjusted for age, sex and deprivation) will be calculated for differences in vaccine
uptake rates between different groups of patients (sex, age, Scottish Index of Multiple Deprivation
categories and at-risk groups) and for investigating trends in vaccine uptake. For VE using information
from linked virological swab data and for serology data (both of which are binary events), a logistic
regression model will be fitted adjusting for the effects of sex, age, socio-economic status and being
in an at-risk morbidity group. VE will be measured by comparing swabs taken after vaccination with swabs
taken before vaccination for all vaccinated individuals, and secondly by comparing swabs taken after
vaccination among those vaccinated to swabs taken among those never vaccinated. A delay of fourteen
days after vaccination will be used to establish the protective effect of the influenza vaccine. Propensity
scores, such as vaccinations, consultations and hospitalisation in the previous flu season, and the effect
modifiers will be used to control for the healthy vaccine effect.13 In addition, using the cohort method the
proportion of influenza-like illness, acute respiratory disease, and other adverse outcomes between
vaccinated and unvaccinated cases will be ascertained. Confidence intervals for the rate ratio and tests
of the differences between two rates will be carried out using the ‘midp method’ in the ‘rate ratio’ (RR)
function and rate2by2.test function respectively using the ‘epitools’ package in R.14 For small samples,
confidence intervals for the RR will be estimated using the Excel workbook.15
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Illness RRs, i.e. the ratio of the rate of first admission to hospital or general practice (GP) consultation in
the vaccinated compared to the rate of first admission to hospital or GP consultation among those who
did not receive the vaccine will be calculated in both the ‘at-risk’ populations and the general population.
This is a direct measure of VE. The unadjusted estimate of VE= (1 – RR) * 100. Adjusted RRs of VE for
prevention of first hospitalisation/GP consultation will be derived from Poisson regression models, adjusting
for sex, age, deprivation and clinical risk group.
Proposed outcome measures
With the emergence of any new pandemic influenza, we will calculate:
l The vaccination uptake in the relevant ‘at risk’ populations (patients < 65 with ‘at-risk’ co-morbidities
and those > 65 years) and the general population recorded by general practices;
l Influenza positivity from virological swab data in vaccinated and unvaccinated patients stratified by
‘at-risk’ populations, age, sex and socio-economic status.
l Influenza positivity from serology data in vaccinated and unvaccinated patients stratified by ‘at-risk’
populations, age, sex and socio-economic status, which will permit the estimation of incidence
of influenza.
l Consultation for influenza-related morbidity (e.g. influenza, pneumonia, COPD and cardiac-related
consultations) and issue of antiviral therapy from general practice data in vaccinated and unvaccinated
patients stratified by ‘at-risk’ populations, age, sex and socio-economic status;
l Mortality and influenza-related serious morbidity (e.g. influenza, pneumonia, COPD and cardiac-related
death and hospitalisation from SMR01 records) in vaccinated and unvaccinated patients stratified by
‘at-risk’ populations, age, sex and socio-economic status; and
l For patients with stored serology (and prior to the introduction of any vaccination) whether
cross-reactivity occurs due to previous exposure to A/H1N1 or A/H1N1 vaccination, other pandemic
influenza or other seasonal influenza vaccination or exposure.
Project timetable and key milestones
Time point Milestones
1st September 2012 Study commencement
1st September–1st July 2013 Practice recruitment, regulatory approvals (Research Ethics and Privacy and Advisory
Committees) and setting up of laboratory collection and storage and automated
practice data collection operating procedures
1st July 2013–30th June 2014 Begin collection and storage of serology samples
Test pilot data extraction and linkage. Development of statistical script
1st July 2014 (and every year
hence until pandemic)
Assessment of serology samples to determine numbers collected. Pilot data practice
data extraction and linkage (using CHI)
1st August 2014 Submission of analysis plan for publication
Pandemic commencement
Month 1–2 Serology samples tested for A/H1N1 pandemic/seasonal influenza seropositivity.
Practice data extraction and linkage to virology SMR01 data
Month 2 Processed statistical dataset undergoes statistical analysis by Statistics and Modelling
Group (Strathclyde University)
Month 3 Initial results published online (once validated)
Month 6 Final report
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